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NON-MARITAL FAMILIES AND  
(OR AFTER?) MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
DEBORAH A. WIDISS* 
ABSTRACT 
 If, as is widely expected, the Supreme Court soon holds that bans on same-sex marriage 
are unconstitutional, it is almost certain that the decision will rely heavily on the Court’s 
reasoning in United States v. Windsor. I strongly support marriage equality. However, a 
decision that amplifies Windsor’s conception of the harm caused by exclusionary marriage 
rules could set back efforts to secure legal recognition of, and respect for, non-marital fami-
lies. That is, Windsor rectified a deep inequality in the law—that same-sex marriages were 
categorically denied federal recognition—but in so doing it embraced a traditional under-
standing of marriage as superior to all other family forms. Its rationale and its rhetorical 
flavor stand in tension with foundational cases from the 1960s and 1970s that dismantled 
the legal systems under which non-marital children were systematically denied benefits and 
that protected the decision-making autonomy of couples who engaged in sexual intimacy 
outside of marriage.  
 The expansion of marriage rights for same-sex couples, including any future victory at 
the Supreme Court, comes at a time when marriage rates more generally are at an all-time 
low and non-marital childbearing is at an all-time high. The lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
(LGB) community is part of these larger trends. Demographers believe that the majority of 
children currently being raised by same-sex couples were conceived in prior heterosexual 
relationships that included a member of the couple. Same-sex couples with relatively low 
levels of educational attainment are more likely to be raising children than couples with 
advanced degrees; same-sex couples that include racial minorities are also more likely to be 
raising children than white couples. If marriage and divorce by same-sex couples follow 
more general trends, the members of the LGB community who are statistically most likely to 
be raising children are also statistically least likely to marry and remain married. Accord-
ingly, even if same-sex couples enjoy universal marriage rights, it is essential to continue to 
advocate support of non-marital families and other blended family forms that depart from 
the “traditional” nuclear family.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 * Associate Professor of Law, Maurer School of Law. I am very grateful to Courtney 
Cahill for organizing the “After Marriage” symposium and inviting me to be part of it. It 
was a day of thought-provoking and inspiring discussion. The symposium was held in Jan-
uary 2014, and this Essay was published in March 2015. Accordingly, this Essay has had a 
relatively long gestation during a period of extraordinarily rapid developments regarding 
same-sex marriage. My thanks to all who offered comments to me at the symposium and to 
those who helped me further consider and revise my thoughts as the underlying legal land-
scape changed, including: Will Baude, Alexander Boni-Saenz, Mary Bonauto, Courtney 
Cahill, June Carbone, Mary Anne Case, Max Eichner, Martha Ertman, Bill Eskridge, Ha-
ley Gorenberg, Clare Huntington, Courtney Joslin, Andy Koppelman, William Kuby, Sere-
na Mayeri, Melissa Murray, Doug NeJaime, Marc Poirier, Laura Rosenbury, Lior Strahi-
levitz, and participants in the Workshop on Regulating Family, Sex, and Gender at the 
University of Chicago Law School; the Emerging Family Law conference; the Law and 
Society Association conference; and the AALS Workshop on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Issues. Thanks too to the editors of the Florida State University Law Review for their ex-
tremely conscientious work (and for their patience with multiple revisions of this Essay as 
the law changed). I am grateful to Dean Austen Parrish and the Maurer School of Law 
Summer Research Stipend Program for supporting this project. The electronic version of 
this Essay was modified slightly after print publication to reflect that the consolidated 
Supreme Court case (pending when this Essay was published) which struck down all re-
maining bans on same-sex marriage is known as Obergefell rather than DeBoer. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 A few months after this Essay is published, the Supreme Court 
will likely decide whether states must permit same-sex couples to 
marry.1 Many expect that the Court will hold that bans on same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional—and if it does, the decision will  
almost certainly rely heavily on United States v. Windsor,2 the 2013 
case that held that the federal government’s categorical refusal to 
recognize same-sex marriages was unconstitutional. Indeed, Windsor 
has already dramatically advanced marriage equality. In addition to 
providing same-sex married couples access to the myriad rights and 
benefits that flow from marriage under federal law,3 Windsor  
includes stirring language that proclaims gay and lesbian relation-
ships to be worthy of respect and acknowledges that the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) unfairly denigrated same-sex marriages as 
“second-tier” marriages.4 These affirmations by the Supreme Court 
are important—and they were overdue. While support for same-sex 
marriage was already growing quickly prior to Windsor, the rate of 
change since Windsor has been staggering.5 This is a heady time for 
the marriage equality movement. I have long argued that it is  
unconstitutional to deny same-sex couples the right to marry,6 and I 
celebrate these developments. 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 
(U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571).  
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE 
ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004) (identifying more than one thousand rights and ben-
efits in federal law premised on marriage). 
 4. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 5. When Windsor was decided, twelve states permitted same-sex couples to marry. 
Greg Stohr, High Court Allows California Gay Marriage, Voids U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG 
(June 26, 2013, 3:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/supreme-court-
ruling-may-allow-gay-marriage-in-california.html. Now, just twenty-one months later, 
thirty-seven states permit marriage. See Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY 
(last updated Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand. 
There are several additional states where pro-marriage decisions are currently stayed. 
Marriage Rulings in the Courts, FREEDOM TO MARRY (last updated Jan. 27, 2015) [herein-
after FREEDOM TO MARRY, Marriage Rulings], http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/ 
marriage-rulings-in-the-courts. The Freedom to Marry website tracks developments and 
provides frequent updates. Id. 
 6. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to 
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (discussing arguments under the fundamental rights 
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 In this Essay, however, I look at Windsor through the lens of ef-
forts to recognize non-marital families. From this perspective, Wind-
sor may be considered a step back. Windsor characterizes state-
conferred marital recognition as a necessary precursor for couples  
to “live with pride in themselves and their union,”7 and the denial of 
federal recognition, the Court fears, “humiliates tens of thousands  
of children” by making it “even more difficult for the children to  
understand the integrity and closeness” of their families.8 Windsor 
thus implicitly resurrects and reinforces claims that non-marital 
childrearing—and sexual relationships outside of marriage, more 
generally—are inherently less worthy of respect than marital  
relationships. This emphasis on the “unique” dignity of state-
conferred marital recognition sits in considerable tension with  
Supreme Court decisions from the 1960s and 1970s that dismantled 
the legal systems under which non-marital children were systemically 
denied benefits and protected the decision-making autonomy of  
couples who engaged in sexual intimacy outside of marriage.9 At this 
earlier point in time, the Court responded to allegations that benefits 
or rights were unfairly limited to marital families by holding that 
marriage was insufficiently related to legitimate government inter-
ests to satisfy equal protection guarantees. By contrast, Windsor’s 
approach to broadening access to the federal benefits of marriage  
further builds up the pedestal on which marriage sits. 
 In the years leading up to Windsor, advocates representing same-
sex couples built on these earlier cases to challenge the exclusive  
reliance on state marriage as providing access to important govern-
mental benefits, rights, and privileges.10 The dramatic advances in 
marriage equality litigation since the decision in Windsor have largely 
ended this other trajectory of litigation. Indeed, the initial complaint 
in DeBoer v. Snyder, one of the pending Supreme Court cases, did not 
allege that Michigan’s ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitu-
tional; rather, the couple challenged a Michigan law that precluded 
them from adopting each other’s children because they were not mar-
ried.11 In other words, the couple sought legal recognition of the func-
tional reality that they were already a family, a family formed not 
                                                                                                                                       
branch of equal protection law); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas 
NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007) (discussing sex discrimination arguments).  
 7. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 8. Id. at 2694. 
 9. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68 (1968).   
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.   
 11. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d by DeBo-
er v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 
2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571).  
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through marriage but through their personal commitments to each 
other and to the children they were raising together.  
 April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse should be able to marry—and I 
very much hope that they will win their case in the Supreme Court. 
But a victory on that front should not end questions regarding the 
appropriateness of premising so many governmental rights and bene-
fits exclusively on marriage, or assumptions that marriage is inher-
ently superior to all other family forms. In this respect, I join other 
commentators who have long warned that the marriage equality 
movement’s valorization of marriage could be detrimental to respect 
for alternative family structures.12  
 Windsor’s rhetoric proclaiming the “unique” dignity of marriage 
reverberates within a larger context: the sweeping demographic 
changes in the nature of marriage within this country. It is now quite 
common for different-sex, as well as same-sex, couples to live togeth-
er without marrying.13 More than forty percent of babies born in the 
United States are born to unmarried parents.14 Roughly half of all 
marriages end in divorce.15 Accordingly, children are routinely raised 
by single parents, cohabiting parents, divorced parents, and in blend-
ed families of various configurations. Moreover, although marriage 
rates were once relatively uniform across different social classes and 
races, that is no longer the case. Statistically speaking, lifelong mar-
riage is now common only among a relatively affluent, highly educat-
ed, and disproportionately white sliver of the population.16  
                                                                                                                                       
 12. See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 98-109 (2008); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-
Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Zachary A. Kramer, The 
Straight and Narrow, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 147; Melissa Murray, Paradigms 
Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 291, 302-03 (2013); Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Mar-
riage, 5 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUDIES 119 (1999). The question of whether same-sex 
marriage should be prioritized in LGBT advocacy efforts goes back several decades. See 
generally Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
379 (2009).  
 13. See PAULA Y. GOODWIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., MARRIAGE AND 
COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) 
OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 1-2 (2010) (finding that nine percent of wom-
en and nine percent of men aged fifteen through forty-four, respectively, were in cohabi-
tating relationships, and that twenty-eight percent of women and men cohabited before 
their first marriage). 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 1 (estimating that forty percent of all children will live at least a por-
tion of their childhoods in a cohabiting household); Fast Stats: Unmarried Childbearing, CDC 
(last updated Jan. 22, 2015), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm (stat-
ing that in 2013, 40.6% of all U.S. births were to unmarried women). 
 15. See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review 
of Research in the 2000s, 72 J.  MARRIAGE  FAM. 403, 405 (2010) (gathering studies showing 
that the lifetime probability of disruption of marriage is between forty and fifty percent).  
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14. 
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 The LGB community is part of these larger trends. Demographers 
believe that the majority of children currently being raised by same-
sex couples were conceived in prior heterosexual relationships that 
included one of the members of the couple.17 Such children often re-
tain legal and emotional ties with both of their birth parents, even if 
they also form ties with a parent’s new same-sex partner. Additional-
ly, even if legally able to marry, some same-sex couples, including 
some couples raising children together, may not do so. Same-sex cou-
ples with relatively low levels of educational attainment are more 
likely to be raising children than couples with college or graduate 
level degrees; same-sex couples that include racial minorities are also 
more likely to be raising children than white couples.18 If marriage 
and divorce by same-sex couples follows more general trends, the 
members of the LGB community who are statistically most likely to 
raise children are also statistically least likely to marry and remain 
married. In other words, even if a future decision by the Supreme 
Court strikes down all state bans on same-sex marriage, many chil-
dren being raised by same-sex couples—like many children, more 
generally—will live in families that depart from the married-parents-
with-children paradigm.  
 Decisions like Windsor, which will almost certainly become part of 
the family law canon, both express and actualize cultural constructs 
of the family. The Court presumes that same-sex couples need state 
recognition to “live with pride in themselves and their union,” and 
that federal denial of such recognition causes non-marital children to 
feel “humiliati[on].”19 Similar themes have been sounded in post-
Windsor marriage equality litigation.20 Certainly, DOMA’s refusal to 
recognize same-sex marriages was insulting and hurtful, and it is 
true that many individuals continue to venerate marriage. But there 
is also growing acceptance for the kaleidoscope of family structures. 
That said, it may well be harmful and humiliating to children with 
unmarried parents (gay or straight) that the Supreme Court of the 
United States contends they cannot understand “the integrity and 
closeness of their own family” if their parents lack a stamp of ap-
proval from the government.21 The way in which advocates, and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court, frame legal questions has importance, 
distinct from the practical outcome of cases. I hope that the next step 
                                                                                                                                       
 17. See ABBIE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., RESEARCH REPORT ON LGB-
PARENT FAMILIES 1, 9 (2014), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/ 
parenting/lgb-parent-families-jul-2014/.  
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.  
 19. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 38-41.  
 21. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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forward for marriage equality will not be a step backward for the 
recognition of diverse family forms, more generally. 
II.   WINDSOR: RECTIFYING STIGMA AND REIFYING STIGMA  
 Windsor rectifies a deep inequality in the law—that lawful same-
sex marriages were denied federal recognition—but in so doing, it 
suggests that marriage is clearly superior to other family forms. 
Thus, in addressing one form of stigma, it reaffirms another. Even as 
Windsor dramatically expands access to key marriage rights, it reaf-
firms the primacy of marriage in ways that are both substantively 
and symbolically harmful. 
 DOMA created “second-tier marriage[s].”22 By denying partici-
pants the benefits and obligations of marriage, as expressed in more 
than 1,000 federal laws, DOMA inflicted both symbolic and tangible 
harms. The majority opinion in Windsor, authored by Justice Antho-
ny Kennedy, focuses on the dignitary aspect of the injury.23 Again 
and again, the opinion characterizes the harm as the denial of “equal 
dignity” with different-sex marriages.24 The more tangible effects of 
the law, such as the $363,000 estate tax that Edie Windsor was 
forced to pay because her marriage was not recognized, are compara-
tively little mentioned. Indeed, even when discussing the practical 
effects of DOMA, the opinion emphasizes their connection to dignity, 
observing: “Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity 
and integrity of the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive [same-
sex] couples . . . of both rights and responsibilities.”25 
 Justice Kennedy is certainly correct that DOMA unfairly—and 
hurtfully—denigrated same-sex couples by singling out same-sex 
marriages as ineligible for federal recognition. DOMA “tells those 
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are 
unworthy of federal recognition.”26 As Justice Kennedy observed, the 
debate over the bill left no question that it was animated, at least for 
many, by disapproval of homosexuality and homosexual relation-
ships.27 A bare desire to harm an unpopular group cannot be the le-
                                                                                                                                       
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 2692-96. 
 24. Id. at 2693 (“The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that 
interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages . . . was its essence.” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question 
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into 
same-sex marriages . . . .”); id. at 2694 (“The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not 
for other reasons like government efficiency.”).  
 25. Id. at 2694. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 2693 (discussing the legislative history of the law and quoting the U.S. 
House report that characterized DOMA as expressing “ ‘both moral disapproval of homo-
2015]  NON-MARITAL FAMILIES 553 
 
gitimate basis of denial of federal benefits.28 The recognition of this 
harm was long overdue, and I heartily applaud it. 
 But the particular way in which the Windsor opinion expresses 
DOMA’s effect implicitly casts aspersions on sexual and parental re-
lationships formed outside of marriage. In “raising up” same-sex 
marriages to comparable status with different-sex marriages, the 
opinion adopts rhetoric that denigrates non-marital relationships and 
childrearing. Thus, we are told, “until recent years, many citizens 
had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same 
sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a 
man and woman in lawful marriage.”29 But New York, like other 
states, decided that same-sex couples “should have the right to marry 
and so live with pride in themselves and their union,” a decision that 
“conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import,” and 
“enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their 
own community.”30 Going beyond the proposition recognized in Law-
rence v. Texas that consensual sexual intimacy between persons of 
the same sex merits constitutional protection, New York “acted to 
give their lawful conduct a lawful status.”31 The Court described this 
status as a “far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate rela-
tionship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State wor-
thy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.”32 The 
refusal of the federal government to recognize such marriages, the 
Court fears, “humiliates tens of thousands of children” by making it 
“even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and 
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in 
their community and in their daily lives.”33  
 In recognizing the injury that DOMA wrought by treating same-
sex marriages as second-tier marriages, the Windsor opinion embrac-
es a traditional understanding of marriage as superior to all other 
family forms. There are other—less normatively loaded—ways in 
which the harms caused by DOMA could have been characterized. 
For example, the opinion could have emphasized that same-sex cou-
ples and their families were harmed by the denial of important tan-
gible rights and benefits under the federal code. Or the injury could 
have been framed more explicitly as a combination of liberty and 
equality claims: That same-sex couples, like different-sex couples, 
                                                                                                                                       
sexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality’ ” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996)).  
 28. See USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973). 
 29. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at 2689, 2692 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at 2694. 
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should have the right to choose to marry if they desire to do so, and 
that they should receive the full panoply of state and federal benefits 
and obligations that come with marriage. Both of these harms are 
also real and significant. They reflect the current reality that mar-
riage works as a gateway to significant federal rights and benefits, 
but they are far less judgmental in tone. The rhetorical framing of 
the injury in Windsor goes further. Repeatedly characterizing mar-
riage as an exalted state to which same-sex couples aspire implicitly 
suggests that same-sex (or different-sex) individuals who choose to 
engage in non-marital sexual relations or non-marital parenting 
will—and more troubling, perhaps, should—feel less “pride” in their 
own relationships and stand with less “dignity” before their children, 
their families, and their communities. 
 To be sure, there is a deep tradition of valorization of marriage in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. “Marriage is a coming together for 
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.”34 “[Marriage] is the foundation of the family and of so-
ciety, without which there would be neither civilization nor pro-
gress.”35 “Marriage . . . [is] fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”36 These are familiar quotations, and they are 
sprinkled liberally throughout the briefs (on both sides) of marriage 
equality cases. Opponents of marriage equality use them to argue 
about the importance of the institution they seek to “protect.” Advo-
cates of marriage equality use them to argue the fundamental nature 
of the injury that exclusion from marriage causes, as well as specifi-
cally to argue that alternative legal statuses, such as civil unions or 
domestic partnerships that provide the rights and benefits of mar-
riage, are an inadequate substitute. And, particularly in recent years, 
advocates of marriage equality have contended that marriage is nec-
essary to protect children of same-sex couples from the “stigma” of 
illegitimacy.37 
 There are undoubtedly some good tactical reasons why marriage 
equality proponents have celebrated the specialness of marriage, and 
Windsor, along with the string of recent successes at the ballot box 
and in lower-court litigation, suggest their power. These themes were 
particularly prevalent in the post-Windsor decision by the Seventh 
Circuit holding that bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitution-
al, where the court asserted that “marriage confers respectability on 
sexual relationship,” and thus to exclude a couple from marriage is to 
                                                                                                                                       
 34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
 35. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).  
 36. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  
 37. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012) (tracing and critiquing the rise of these arguments in 
cases challenging the denial of same-sex marriage). 
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deny it a “coveted status.”38 The court also quoted Windsor’s language 
on the “humiliation” experienced by children living in states with 
marriage bans,39 and expanded on the theme by positing that adopted 
children of same-sex couples would want their parents to be married 
so that they could be “in step with their peers.”40 Notably absent from 
the court’s analysis was any recognition that in any given classroom, 
there would likely be many children who have unmarried, different-
sex parents.41 As this example illustrates, and as others have previ-
ously noted, arguments regarding the special “dignity” of marriage 
come with some real costs as well.42 The language put forward by ad-
vocates, and ultimately adopted by the Court in Windsor, regarding 
non-marital families is deeply in tension with efforts made a genera-
tion ago to lessen the importance—both symbolic and substantive—of 
whether a child was born to a legal marriage.  
III.   NON-MARITAL RECOGNITION BEFORE WINDSOR 
 Contrast Windsor’s concern regarding the “humiliation” suffered 
by children whose parents’ marriages are not recognized by the fed-
eral government with the Supreme Court’s assertions in Levy v. Lou-
isiana, a 1968 decision which held unconstitutional the denial of 
wrongful death benefits to non-marital children.43 In Levy, the Court 
proclaimed that it started from the premise that “illegitimate chil-
dren are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their be-
ing.”44 In so declaring, the Court did not simply establish the doctri-
nal point that non-marital children had rights enforceable under the 
Equal Protection Clause.45 Rather, the striking language was part of 
a larger recognition that the children’s relationship with their mother 
existed whatever the legal label attached, that is, that “she cared for 
them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and 
in the spiritual sense; [and] in her death they suffered wrong in the 
sense that any dependent would.”46 In Glona v. American Guaran-
tee & Liability Insurance Co., the companion case which addressed 
the corollary issue of whether such benefits could be denied to the 
mother of an illegitimate child, the Court stated flatly: “To say that 
the test of equal protection should be the ‘legal’ rather than the bio-
                                                                                                                                       
 38. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 39. Id. at 659. 
 40. Id. at 663-64. 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14. 
 42. See sources cited supra note 12.  
 43. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 44. Id. at 70 (citing Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 337 (1962)). 
 45. See id.  
 46. Id. at 72.  
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logical relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection 
Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such ‘legal’ 
lines as it chooses.”47  
 Four years later, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the 
Court extended the Levy rule to hold that dependent illegitimate 
children were to be “on an equal footing” with dependent legitimate 
children in claims for workers’ compensation benefits after the death 
of a father, rather than a mother.48 The Court again emphasized that 
the legal label did not reflect the reality of the family situation: 
“[T]he dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegit-
imate children for their father were as great as those of the four legit-
imate children.”49 The reasoning in these cases was then extended to 
recognize that non-marital children had an enforceable right to child 
support from their natural parents,50 states could not limit welfare 
benefits to marital families,51 non-marital children could not be cate-
gorically denied the right to inherit intestate from either their fathers 
or their mothers,52 and, at least in certain circumstances, non-marital 
fathers had parental rights that merited due process protection.53  
 These early illegitimacy decisions recognize—and reject—a pre-
cursor to the “responsible procreation” argument used in the same-
sex marriage cases today: that is, that state-funded or state-
mandated benefits were properly limited to marital families as an 
incentive for couples to marry rather than raise children outside of 
marriage. (As described by other commentators, in the same-sex 
marriage context, the argument has morphed from claims premised 
on punishing non-marital families to the modern, rather strained, 
argument that because same-sex couples cannot have children by ac-
cident, they do not need these incentives whereas different-sex cou-
ples do.)54 For example, in Glona, the defendants asserted that the 
denial of benefits was an appropriate punishment for the “sin” of hav-
                                                                                                                                       
 47. 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).  
 48. 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 169.  
 50. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).  
 51. See N.J. Welfare Rights v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).  
 52. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 
(1978) (upholding a statute that included specific proof requirements for non-marital chil-
dren seeking to inherit from their fathers).  
 53. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
 54. For detailed discussions of the responsible procreation argument and its weak-
nesses, see, for example, Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex 
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2009), Julie 
A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 781 (2012), and Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withhold-
ing Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403 (2009).  
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ing engaged in non-marital sex.55 The Court rejected the argument, 
asserting it would be “farfetched to assume that women have illegit-
imate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their 
death.”56 Similarly, in Weber, the defendant argued that it was justi-
fied in limiting wrongful death benefits to marital children to pro-
mote the state’s interest in “protecting ‘legitimate family relation-
ships.’”57 While acknowledging the importance of the interest alleged, 
the Court concluded that the statute could not be said to “promote” 
marriage, because “it [cannot] be thought here that persons will shun 
illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the bene-
fits of workmen’s compensation.”58  
 In these illegitimacy cases, the Court also considered—and again 
rejected—claims that reliance on the marital status of the parents 
was appropriate because it was an effective proxy for the dependency 
of children. Although the Court acknowledged that abandoning the 
bright-line rule of marriage would lead to more difficult assessments 
of the substance of the relationship between the deceased parent and 
the child, the Court consistently (and rather cursorily) suggested that 
courts or agencies could adequately handle these questions. Thus, for 
example, the Court in Glona stated that its holding “may conceivably 
be a temptation to some to assert motherhood fraudulently,” but as-
serted that such a question was merely one of “proof,” and “where the 
claimant was clearly the mother,” benefits could not be denied.59 
 States could require claimants to establish a functional relation-
ship—i.e., dependency—where the benefits in question were designed 
to compensate family members for the loss of a provider.60 The key 
move that the Court made was holding that the absence of a marital 
relationship between the adults could not be presumed to establish 
the absence of a functional relationship between the parent and his 
or her child.61 The Court assumed that claimants would be limited to 
                                                                                                                                       
 55. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972) (quoting the earlier deci-
sion by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case, Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 424 So. 
2d 567, 570 (La. 1970)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Glona, 391 U.S. at 76; cf. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“We recognize 
the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity. Those problems are not to be light-
ly brushed aside, but neither can they be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to 
shield otherwise invidious discrimination.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Weber, 406 U.S. at 174-75 (“By limiting recovery to dependents of the 
deceased, Louisiana substantially lessens the possible problems of locating illegitimate 
children and of determining uncertain claims of parenthood. . . . Our ruling requires equal-
ity of treatment between two classes of persons the genuineness of whose claims the State 
might in any event be required to determine.”). 
 61. See id. at 173 (“It may perhaps be said that statutory distinctions between the legit-
imate and illegitimate reflect closer family relationships in that the illegitimate is more often 
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biological offspring, but at the time biological testing was far less 
precise than it is today, and many of the cases arose after the puta-
tive parent had died.62 Evidence that an adult had acted like a parent 
by supporting the child, living with the child, or formally acknowl-
edging the child was often deemed sufficient. In other words, a func-
tional connection was grounds to infer a biological connection. 
 Melissa Murray has persuasively argued that these decisions were 
less transformative than typically assumed because in each of these 
early cases, the Court compares the parent-child relationship—and, 
more surprisingly, the relationship between the parents—to a mari-
tal norm.63 Thus, she concludes, these and other cases from around 
the same time period that recognized parental rights of unmarried 
fathers “eliminate[d] some of the burdens of illegitimacy while main-
taining a pro-marriage, pro-marital family impulse.”64 This is an im-
portant insight, but it perhaps understates the symbolic and sub-
stantive importance of the Court’s recognition of these non-marital 
families. Even if the Glonas and the Levys “looked like” marital fami-
lies, the rule established by their wins reaches non-marital children 
whose families may depart from the marital norm more dramatically, 
so long as they establish dependency.65 As a policy matter, a program 
that seeks to provide income to a dependent child in the event of the 
death of a parent should consider whether such dependency exists. 
The more important point, perhaps, is that we should not presume 
such dependency even when applied to marital children or marital 
couples.66 
 To be sure, these early illegitimacy cases did not challenge the as-
sumption that marriage could be used as a proxy for dependency be-
tween adults.67 Indeed, in Califano v. Boles, a 1979 decision, the Su-
preme Court upheld a provision in the Social Security Act that made 
benefits available to the surviving spouse of a deceased wage-earner 
                                                                                                                                       
not under care in the home of the father nor even supported by him . . . . Whatever the merits 
elsewhere of this contention, it is not compelling in a statutory compensation scheme 
where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to anyone’s recovery.”).  
 62. See generally, e.g., Paternity Tests: Blood Tests and DNA, FINDLAW (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2015), http://files.findlaw.com/pdf/family/family.findlaw.com_paternity_paternity-
tests-blood-tests-and-dna.pdf.  
 63. Murray, supra note 37, at 393-99. 
 64. Id. at 399; see also id. at 399-411 (making a similar critique of the reasoning in the 
cases concerning parental rights of unmarried fathers). 
 65. Here it may be important to distinguish between requiring a showing of dependency 
of a child on the deceased parent, which does seem legitimately related to the objective of 
these benefits plans, and requiring a showing of “marital”-like relationships between the non-
married parents, which does not seem related to the objective of the benefits.  
 66. In fact, the Court in Weber emphasizes this point, noting that where a married 
couple had separated, the state likewise required a showing of dependency. 406 U.S. at 174 
n.12 (citing Sandidge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 29 So. 2d 522 (La. Ct. App. 1947)).  
 67. My thanks to Serena Mayeri for making this point to me.  
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who was raising the wage-earner’s dependent child but denied bene-
fits to a surviving parent who was raising a wage-earner’s dependent 
child if she had not been married to the wage-earner.68 Although the 
dissenters relied on Levy, Weber, and other cases concerning non-
marital children to argue that heightened scrutiny applied and that 
the denial was unconstitutional, the five-justice majority applied ra-
tional basis review and concluded that the distinction was “reasona-
ble” because it was less likely that the unmarried surviving parent 
had been dependent on the wage-earner.69  
 During the same time period, the Court also recognized the im-
portance of extended family bonds. In Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, a 1977 decision, the Court struck down a zoning ordinance that 
adopted such a narrow definition of who could live in a single-family 
home that it precluded a grandson from living with his grandmother, 
uncle, and cousin.70  Again, the Court’s rhetoric was soaring, not only 
protecting Ms. Moore’s personal choice to live with both of her grand-
sons but also celebrating the values of kinship networks: “Even if 
conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in extend-
ed family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom 
of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our 
history, that supports a larger conception of the family.”71 Moore did 
not rely explicitly on the cases recognizing constitutional rights for 
non-marital children; rather, it drew on substantive due process deci-
sions concerning choice in reproduction and childrearing decisions. 
But they were intimately connected. As Justice Brennan’s concur-
rence pointed out, extended family networks were particularly preva-
lent within the African American community;72 this, in turn, was par-
tially because black women were (and remain) disproportionately 
likely to have children outside of marriage and to rely on kin for sup-
port.73 In this respect, Moore gestures towards racial dynamics that 
likewise simmered under the surface in Levy, Glona, and Weber.74 
                                                                                                                                       
 68. 443 U.S. 282, 289 (1979).  
 69. Id.  
 70. 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2, 500 (1977). 
 71. Id. at 505. 
 72. Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 73. At the time that East Cleveland put the ordinance in place, it had a growing black 
middle class population; the ordinance was intended to reduce white flight and to distin-
guish the suburb from the “ghetto,” typified by single, black women and their children, on 
the other side of the city line. See generally Peggy Cooper Davis, Moore v. East Cleveland: 
Constructing the Suburban Family, in FAMILY LAW STORIES (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).  
 74. Serena Mayeri shows that attorneys who litigated the non-marital recognition cases 
often highlighted the disparate racial impact of the policies; the Court, however, has not 
framed its analysis in racial terms. See Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitu-
tion of the Non-Marital Family, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author). 
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 Levy, Glona, Weber, and their progeny, together with Moore, were 
important milestones in broadening constitutional understandings of 
the family beyond the “traditional” nuclear family of married parents 
living with children.75 Both doctrinally and rhetorically, they af-
firmed that parent-child relationships formed outside of marriage, as 
well as extended kinship networks, can be “real” family relationships. 
As family forms have further diversified in recent years, courts and 
legislators have been increasingly open to recognizing “de facto” pa-
rental relationships, formed in the absence of either a biological con-
nection or a legal parental relationship, as giving rise to enforceable 
rights and responsibilities.76 Courts have also been increasingly will-
ing to recognize that intimacy between adults can give rise to de-
pendency and reliance, enforceable through express or implied con-
tract law, even in the absence of marriage.77 These developments of-
fer a strong basis for building a broader conception of the family that 
merits constitutional protection and respect and reconsidering gov-
ernment policies that use marriage as the primary or sole marker of 
intimate adult relationships. 
 A somewhat similar trajectory can be seen if one looks at the Su-
preme Court’s decisions concerning sexual intimacy outside of mar-
riage. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court protected the right of 
couples to make choices regarding contraception within the “sacred” 
space of marriage.78 But by the time the Court decided Eisenstadt v. 
Baird in 1972, it expressed the privacy right at issue as the right of 
an “individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”79 And then in Law-
rence v. Texas, the Court relied on Eisenstadt to protect adults’ rights 
to make decisions regarding sexual intimacy in the privacy of their 
                                                                                                                                       
 75. That said, the Supreme Court continues to sometimes privilege parental claims 
stemming from marital relationships over biological or functional relationships, as evi-
denced most strongly in the splintered opinions in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 
(1989). For a discussion of legal disadvantages for non-marital children that persists today, 
see generally Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination 
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011).  
 76. See Courtney G. Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) Child Behind, 48 FAM. L. Q. 495 
(2014) (discussing the expansion of parenting rights in these contexts but warning that 
expansion of marriage equality could erode some of this progress); cf. Courtney Megan 
Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship and the Legal Regulation of 
Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 53-65 (2012) (arguing that through legal 
regulation of de facto parentage and domestic partnerships, courts and legislatures express 
idealized normative expectations of what parenting and marriage “should” look like, even 
though constitutional privacy protections prohibit the state from regulating these relation-
ships more directly). 
 77. See generally, e.g., CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (2010). 
 78. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
 79. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
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homes, even though the same-sex couple involved was incapable of 
procreating and (at that time) legally prohibited from marrying.80 No-
tably, Lawrence does not just grudgingly tolerate non-marital sexual 
conduct. The decision celebrated the “autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct.”81 Accordingly, the road from Griswold to Eisenstadt to Law-
rence seems to describe a move from sanctioning and regulating sex-
ual conduct as permissible only within marriage, to acknowledging 
and respecting personal choices to engage in sexual conduct outside 
of marriage.82 
 That said, even before Windsor, some commentators argued that 
the liberty established by Lawrence was, as Katherine Franke ex-
pressed it, a “domesticated liberty.”83 Lawrence protected sexual deci-
sion-making, but emphasized that it occurred within the privacy of 
the home.84 Moreover, the decision’s rhetoric suggested that its ani-
mating concern was protecting the sexual intimacy of well-
established couples with a “personal bond that is more enduring” 
than the sexual contact itself.85 The lawyers for John Geddes Law-
rence and Tyron Garner at least tacitly encouraged the Court to as-
sume that their clients were such a couple, although we now know 
that they were casual acquaintances who denied having had sexual 
relations at all.86  
 Windsor suggests that these concerns regarding Lawrence’s scope 
and foundation were well grounded. Now that same-sex couples may 
marry in many states, Justice Kennedy, again writing for the Court, 
clearly suggests that they should marry. Sexual intimacy, the Court 
(again) suggests, is best and most properly expressed within the 
heavily regulated institution of marriage. Windsor threatens to un-
dermine the hard-fought protections for non-marital children and for 
sexual autonomy outside of marriage.  
                                                                                                                                       
 80. 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003).  
 81. Id. at 562.  
 82. In fact, although Eisenstadt explicitly preserved the right of the state to criminalize 
non-marital sex through fornication statutes, see Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 449-50, courts and 
commentators have interpreted Lawrence as signaling that such criminal statutes are proba-
bly unconstitutional. See, e.g., Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005). A federal district 
court in Utah recently relied on Lawrence to hold that criminalizing polygamous relationships 
is also unconstitutional. See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).   
 83. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1399 (2004); see also Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1140 (2004); David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453.  
 84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012).  
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IV.   NON-MARITAL RECOGNITION AFTER WINDSOR 
 In the years leading up to Windsor, gay and lesbian couples built 
on the foundational Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part III to 
challenge the denial of state or private benefits. Some of these cases 
predated the possibility of marriage at all, relying on guarantees of 
equal employment or more general equality principles to challenge 
the categorical denial of benefits to same-sex couples that were rou-
tinely provided to different-sex couples.87 More recently, cases were 
brought when marriage rights were available in some jurisdictions 
but not in those where the plaintiffs lived,88 or to challenge state 
counterparts to DOMA that stripped away the right to domestic 
partner benefits that plaintiff couples had previously enjoyed.89 These 
claims, like the illegitimacy claims described above, argued that mar-
riage was an insufficiently precise proxy for achieving legitimate gov-
ernmental objectives—like recognizing long-term, committed rela-
tionships—and accordingly, that categories needed to be broadened 
to recognize same-sex couples. Courts often agreed.90 
 The symposium at which I first presented this Essay was held in 
January 2014. At that time, I posited that a similar strategy could be 
used to challenge the federal marriage discrimination that persists 
even after DOMA’s categorical ban on federal recognition was struck 
down. As I discuss in an essay published at about the same time as 
the symposium was held, same-sex couples are currently sorted into 
three tiers, with married couples who live in states that recognize 
their marriages receiving full federal marriage benefits; same-sex 
married couples who live in states that refuse to recognize their mar-
riages receiving most, but not all, federal benefits; and same-sex cou-
ples who are unmarried, even those in civil unions or domestic part-
                                                                                                                                       
 87. See, e.g., Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers State Univ., 689 A.2d 828 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 447-48 
(Or. Ct. App. 1998); Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1992); see also Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001) (challenging a univer-
sity policy of making certain housing available only to “married” students). 
 88. See, e.g., Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005) (chal-
lenging state and city policies limiting availability of health insurance and other employ-
ment benefits to spouses of employees); Donaldson v. Montana, 292 P.3d 364, 364 (Mont. 
2012) (broad claim seeking an injunction to order the legislature to enact a statutory 
scheme that would provide the equivalent of marital benefits to same-sex couples who were 
in committed relationships but were precluded from marrying); Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. 
Technical Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL 1217283, at *6 (N.H. May 3, 2006). 
 89. See Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (challenging state 
law eliminating ability of public employers to provide medical and fringe benefits to un-
married co-habitants of public employees); Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 
2010), aff’d sub nom Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 90. See, e.g., Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (providing employment benefits to same-
sex partners); Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 793-94 (similar); Bedford, 2006 WL 
1217283, at *9 (similar); Tanner, 971 P.2d at 448 (similar); see also Levin, 754 N.E.2d at 
1111 (providing same-sex couples access to married student housing).  
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nerships that are functional equivalents to marriage under state law, 
receiving almost no federal recognition.91 The government has miti-
gated the problem considerably by adopting place-of-celebration rules 
to determine which marriages are lawful in virtually all instances, 
except where clearly barred by statutory language or regulatory lan-
guage.92 But some key benefits—most notably Social Security recog-
nition and certain veterans benefits—remain, as of March 2015 at 
least, unavailable to married couples who live in non-recognition 
states.93  
 This denial could be challenged on constitutional grounds.94 That 
is, federal laws typically use marriage as an administratively conven-
ient mechanism for identifying couples who are likely to have made a 
long-term commitment to each other, and/or likely to have inter-
twined finances.95 Same-sex married couples living in non-recognition 
states have made the same level of legal commitment to each other as 
other spouses have; they are lawfully married. Their marriages are 
also administered and recorded by a state, simply not the state in 
which they happen to live. Since the federal government routinely 
recognizes the validity of marriages from all fifty states, it should be 
inapposite which state marries a given couple, so long as some state 
does.96 In other words, it is hard to see how a policy that denies 
recognition to valid out-of-state marriages is sufficiently tailored to 
                                                                                                                                       
 91. See Deborah A. Widiss, Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 IND. L.J. 43, 51-53 (2014). 
More recent developments in federal recognition are discussed in Deborah A. 
Widiss & Andrew Koppelman, A Marriage by Any Other Name: Why Civil Unions Should 
Receive Federal Recognition, IND. J. L. & SOC. EQUALITY (forthcoming 2015) (on file with 
author). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. For a long time after Windsor was decided, married couples who lived in 
non-recognition states were also not recognized as spouses under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), but in February 2015, the Department of Labor changed the regula-
tions to replace the domicile approach with a place-of-celebration approach, effective March 
27, 2015. See Definition of Spouse Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 
9989 (Mar. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).   
 94. Indeed, there have reportedly been several law suits filed challenging the Social 
Security Administration’s refusal to recognize out-of-state marriages of applicants. See 
Paula Span, Spouses Denied Social Security Survivors’ Benefits, N.Y. TIMES: THE NEW OLD 
AGE (Nov. 11, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/spouses-
denied-social-security-survivors-benefits/?_r=0. 
 95. See Widiss, supra note 91, at 46-48, and sources cited therein. 
 96. One could imagine an argument that the federal government has a federalism-
based interest in respecting a couple’s domicile state’s policy choice to refuse to recognize a 
marriage. That argument, however, would be hard to square with the aggressive approach 
the federal government has taken in adopting place-of-celebration rules wherever possible. 
The current policy means that federal policies intended to work together may not do so, 
because couples are considered married for some purposes (e.g., tax) but not married for 
others (e.g., Social Security). Moreover, prior to the current debate over same-sex marriage, 
domicile rules in these statutes typically had little significance, since one state almost al-
ways recognized valid marriages from other states, even if their substantive rules regard-
ing marriage eligibility varied. See Widiss, supra note 91, at 52.  
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achieve legitimate government objectives to pass even rational basis 
review, let alone any kind of heightened scrutiny that might apply.97  
 The federal government’s refusal to recognize civil unions and 
domestic partnerships that offer full spousal benefits and obligations 
under state law is also open to challenge. Federal agencies have of-
fered little explanation for this exclusion other than the fact that rel-
evant statutes reference “marriage” or “spouse.”98 As I argue else-
where, this is an unduly literalist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion.99 Federal law generally looks to state law to identify valid mar-
riages, and under state law, these alternative statuses are generally 
included within state definitions of marriage or spouse.100 And again, 
there probably is insufficient justification for refusing to recognize 
such statuses to pass constitutional scrutiny. Couples who have 
                                                                                                                                       
 97. Most recent decisions assessing the constitutionality of discrete denials of “mari-
tal” benefits to same-sex couples have treated the classification as being based on sexual 
orientation, since gay and lesbian couples are prohibited from marrying. See, e.g., Bassett, 
951 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (“[The act] explicitly incorporates statutes that draw classifications 
based on sexual orientation and renders access to benefits legally impossible only for gay 
and lesbian couples.”); Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (D. Ariz. 2010) (because 
the act “makes benefits available on terms that are a legal impossibility for gay and lesbian 
couples,” it “unquestionably imposes different treatment on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion”), aff’d sub nom Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). A growing number of 
federal courts have held that classifications on the basis of sexual orientation trigger 
heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 704 F.3d 471 
(9th Cir. 2014); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
197 (2013), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/9/15/eyer.html (collecting and dis-
cussing numerous lower court decisions that have applied heightened scrutiny to classifica-
tions on the basis of sexual orientation).  
 98. See, e.g., Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,873 (pro-
posed Oct. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pts. 890, 892, 894) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) 
(2012) (Office of Personnel Management regulations stating benefits could not be provided 
to domestic partners because the relevant statute “defines ‘member of [employee’s] family’ 
to mean the employee’s ‘spouse’ and certain children.”)); Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 
201 (IRS opinion letter categorically denying recognition to civil unions or domestic part-
nerships without offering a rationale). There are a few agencies that recognize civil unions 
and domestic partnerships for some purposes, most prominently of which, the Social Secu-
rity Agency, applies a statute that incorporates consideration of state intestacy law. See 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, GN 00210.001 WINDSOR SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE CLAIMS—INTRODUCTION (2014), available at https://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/ 
1nx/0200210001.  
 99. See generally Widiss & Koppelman, supra note 91. 
 100. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-107(1) (2013) (containing almost identical lan-
guage); NEV. REV. STATS. § 122A.200(1)(a) (2009) (“Domestic partners have the same 
rights, protections, and benefits, and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, 
and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court 
rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are 
granted to and imposed upon spouses.” (emphasis added)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-33 (West 
2007) (“Whenever in any law, rule, regulation, judicial or administrative proceeding or 
otherwise, reference is made to ‘marriage,’ ‘husband,’ ‘wife,’ ‘spouse,’ ‘family,’ ‘immediate 
family,’ ‘dependent,’ ‘next of kin,’ ‘widow,’ ‘widower,’ ‘widowed’ or another word which in a 
specific context denotes a marital or spousal relationship, the same shall include a civil 
union . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Widiss & Koppelman, supra note 91 (referencing 
additional statutes).  
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formed these relationships have made precisely the same legal com-
mitment to each other as spouses have. Since the statuses are—like 
marriage—recorded, administered, and dissolved by states, recogni-
tion would be unlikely to impose significant additional, administra-
tive burdens on the federal government. A pre-Windsor challenge to 
the IRS’s refusal to recognize California domestic partnerships and 
marriages continued even after Windsor as a more narrow challenge 
to the ongoing refusal to recognize domestic partnerships.101 The 
plaintiffs contended that even though California now permits same-
sex couples to marry, some of the couples who formed domestic part-
nerships no longer had the capacity to marry, and that their earlier 
legal unions should be recognized by the federal government as eligi-
ble for “marital” rights and benefits.102 The district court, however, 
dismissed the claim on the ground that such individualized barriers 
could not be addressed in a class action.103  
 My hope when I first developed these ideas was that constitution-
al litigation or policy advocacy could benefit not only same-sex cou-
ples in formal legal statuses who were—and still are—denied federal 
recognition, but also that it could be instrumental in rethinking the 
out-size importance of marriage in federal policies more generally.104 
Since the time that I began to develop these ideas, however, the focus 
has shifted strongly to challenging the underlying discrimination im-
plicit in state bans on same-sex marriage rather than the refusal to 
broaden access to federal “marital” rights. Same-sex couples have 
been remarkably successful in these cases. According to the advocacy 
group, Freedom to Marry, which tracks marriage litigation, as of 
January 2015, the win-loss record since Windsor was decided is sixty-
one to five.105 In light of the tidal wave of victories, I certainly do not 
question or regret advocates’ focus on securing marriage equality in 
all states. I celebrate these wins. 
 I write this Essay, however, with an eye towards the non-marital 
recognition questions that will persist even if—and after—the Su-
preme Court strikes down all state bans on same-sex marriage. That 
is, the plaintiffs in the marriage equality cases obviously seek to be 
married. They should be able to do so. But same-sex couples more 
generally, like different-sex couples, must determine whether  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 101. See Responsive Brief of Plaintiff Class Re Subsequent Legal Developments at 1, 
Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. CV-4:10-01564-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. CV-4:10-01564-CW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014). 
 104. See Widiss, supra note 91, at 62-65 (discussing some federal policies that should 
permit broader eligibility and others that could be tailored more narrowly). 
 105. FREEDOM TO MARRY, Marriage Rulings, supra note 5.  
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and when to marry. In other words, even after marriage equality, 
there will be same-sex couples, including couples raising children, 
who are not married. 
V.   NON-MARITAL RECOGNITION AFTER OBERGEFELL? 
 The expansion of marriage rights for same-sex couples, including 
a potential victory in Obergefell, comes as marriage rates in this 
country generally are at an all-time low, and non-marital childbear-
ing is at an all-time high. Barely half of all adults are currently mar-
ried, as compared to seventy-two percent of adults in 1960.106 Approx-
imately half of all marriages end in divorce.107 More than forty per-
cent of children born in America today are born to unmarried par-
ents.108 And although approximately half of those unmarried parents 
are living together when their children are born, very few remain to-
gether five years later; many of these individuals go on to have chil-
dren with multiple partners.109 It is also quite common to live with 
extended family networks and for grandparents, in particular, to play 
a major role in caring for children.110 Moreover, all of these trends 
vary highly according to social class, educational achievement, and 
race. Women with more education and higher levels affluence marry 
later than women with less; ultimately, however, they are more likely 
to marry and far less likely to divorce.111 Whites and Asians are much 
more likely to marry than Blacks and Latinos.112 Conversely, rates of 
unmarried child-bearing are higher for Blacks and Latinos than for 
Whites, although they are also quite high among relatively poor 
and/or uneducated white women.113 The cumulative upshot of these 
various trends is that it is extremely common for American 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                       
 106. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE 
MARRIED — A RECORD LOW (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/ 
12/Marriage-Decline.pdf.   
 107. See, e.g., Cherlin, supra note 15, at 404-05. 
 108. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 109. See, e.g., Cherlin, supra note 15, at 406-07. 
 110. See, e.g., id. at 413-14.  
 111. See, e.g., id. at 404-05. 
 112. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE: PATTERNS BY GENDER, RACE, AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 6-7 (2013); 
JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2012 (2013). 
 113. See, e.g., CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN (2014), avail-
able at http://www.childtrends.org/?indicators=births-to-unmarried-women (gathering sta-
tistics from multiple reports); see also KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN 
KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 226 (2005) (sociological 
study of non-marital parenting by poor women in Philadelphia). 
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children—particularly, but definitely not exclusively, poor or working 
class children—to live in family configurations other than the tradi-
tional nuclear family.114  
 The LGB community, like the heterosexual community, of course 
varies by class, educational attainment levels, race, and ethnicity,115 
although some studies suggest LGB individuals are disproportionate-
ly likely to be poor.116 Looking specifically at same-sex couples raising 
children together, demographers identify some trends that could be 
significant for thinking about non-marital children and the reach of 
Windsor, as well as Obergefell or any other future Supreme Court 
decisions advancing marriage equality. Data gathered in 2013 (some 
pre-dating Windsor and some post-dating Windsor) suggests that 
there are approximately 690,000 same-sex couples living together.117 
Approximately nineteen percent of these couples are raising children 
together, with rates of childrearing much higher for lesbian couples 
than for gay male couples.118 At that time, the vast majority of same-
sex couples raising children together were unmarried.119 Undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                                       
 114. For a thoughtful exploration of what these demographic trends mean, or should 
mean, for family law, see Clare Huntington, Post-Marital Family Law, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
 115. See, e.g., GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT DEMOGRAPHICS: COMPARISONS 
AMONG POPULATION-BASED SURVEYS (2014), available at http://williamsinstitute.law. 
ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-demogs-sep-2014.pdf (finding LGBT populations generally 
share the racial and ethnic characteristics of non-LGBT individuals).  
 116. See, e.g., M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., NEW PATTERNS OF POVERTY IN 
THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY (2013), available at http://Williams 
institute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGB-Poverty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf; GARY J. GATES, 
WILLIAMS INST., SAME-SEX AND DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY: 2005-2011 (2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/ACS-2013.pdf.  
 117. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGB FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS: ANALYSES OF 
THE 2013 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY (2014) [hereinafter LGB FAMILIES AND 
RELATIONSHIPS], available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgb-
families-nhis-sep-2014.pdf. 2010 census data suggested that there were 650,000 same-sex 
couples. See GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2013) [hereinafter LGBT PARENTING], available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf.  
 118. GARY J. GATES, NAT’L COUNCIL ON FAMILY RELATIONS, FAMILY FORMATION AND 
RAISING CHILDREN AMONG SAME-SEX COUPLES (2011), available at http://williams 
institute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-Badgett-NCFR-LGBT-Families-December-
2011.pdf. 
 119. Gary Gates, analyzing data from the 2013 National Health Survey, estimates that 
of the 200,000 children likely being raised by same-sex couples, only 30,000 had married 
parents while 170,000 had unmarried parents. See GATES, LGB FAMILIES AND 
RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 117, at 5. This data suggested little variation in the percentage 
of married and unmarried couples raising children, see id. (eighteen percent and nineteen 
percent, respectively), while some earlier work suggested that a higher percentage of cou-
ples who considered themselves married than those who considered themselves unmarried 
were raising children together. See GATES, LGBT PARENTING, supra note 117 (thirty-one 
percent and fourteen percent, respectively). But even if this earlier study is more accurate in 
terms of relative rates of child-raising, the majority of children would still be being raised by 
unmarried parents because there are so many more unmarried than married same-sex cou-
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marriage rates have risen since 2013, but, even if marriage rights 
become universal, it is highly unlikely that all same-sex couples rais-
ing children together will marry.120  
 This is particularly true because LGB parenting is not evenly dis-
tributed across race, class, or education levels. About forty-five per-
cent of different-sex couples are raising children together; this rate is 
relatively consistent across all educational achievement levels, alt-
hough as noted above, the marital status rates vary.121 Among same-
sex couples, by contrast, child-raising rates vary sharply according to 
educational level, as a much higher rate of couples with relatively 
little education are raising children than those with more educa-
tion.122 Specifically, forty-three percent of same-sex couples with less 
than a high school education are raising children together, whereas 
just ten percent of same-sex couples with college degrees are raising 
children together.123 Not surprisingly, since educational attainment 
correlates with income, same-sex couples raising children have sub-
stantially lower incomes on average than same-sex couples in gen-
eral.124 Rates also vary by race; same-sex couples that include Blacks 
or Latinos are far more likely than white same-sex couples to be rais-
ing children.125 In other words, if trends regarding marriage and di-
vorce by same-sex couples follow more general trends, the members 
of the LGB community who are statistically most likely to be raising 
children are also statistically least likely to marry and remain mar-
ried. Moreover, surveys suggest that there are nearly 600,000 
 
                                                                                                                                       
ples. Additionally, some of the couples identified in this earlier study as “considering them-
selves married” may not have legal marriages. See GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., SAME-SEX 
COUPLES IN US CENSUS BUREAU DATA: WHO GETS COUNTED AND WHY (2010), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-Who-Gets-Counted-Aug-2010. 
pdf (explaining discrepancies between marital status reported to the Census Bureau and 
legal status).  
 120. There are currently no states where more than sixty percent of all same-sex 
households are married spouses, even though marriage has been legal in some states for 
several years. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF SAME-SEX HOUSEHOLDS 
(2013), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/ (reporting percentage of total 
same-sex households that are married households as 59% in Massachusetts, 53.4% in Con-
necticut, and 52.7% in Iowa). 
 121. GATES, supra note 118, at F3.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. The decline is generally linear across educational levels. It goes from forty-
three percent of couples with less than a high school degree, to thirty-two percent of those 
with a high school degree; to twenty percent of those with some college, to ten percent of 
those who have completed college; but there is a small uptick to fifteen percent of couples 
with graduate degrees. Id.; see also Michael J. Rosenfeld, Nontraditional Families and 
Childhood Progress Through School, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 755, 765 (2010). 
 124. Rosenfeld, supra note 123, at 765. 
 125. GATES, supra note 118, at F3; GATES, LGBT PARENTING, supra note 117, at 4; 
Rosenfeld, supra note 123, at 765. 
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adults who identify as LGB who are raising children as single par-
ents because they are not currently in a (same-sex or different-sex) 
relationship.126  
 Consideration of family formation patterns for same-sex couples 
helps to explain these patterns, which might seem surprising.127 Pub-
lic discourse on same-sex couples with children typically foregrounds 
couples who jointly planned parenthood through the private adoption 
of a newborn or young baby, artificial insemination through a clinic, 
or surrogacy. These paths to parenthood are becoming more common, 
particularly for younger same-sex couples who are coming of age in a 
time when homosexuality is more generally accepted.128 But they can 
also be quite expensive and are therefore most likely to be used by 
relatively affluent same-sex couples.129 Adoption of older children out 
of foster care, and artificial insemination by a known donor outside 
the clinic process, are more affordable alternatives, and these meth-
ods are also frequently used.130 But demographers believe that such 
jointly-planned children account for less than half of the children be-
ing raised by same-sex couples. The most common path to 
parenthood for men and women who are part of same-sex relation-
ships, or identify as LGB, is conceiving children in prior heterosexual 
encounters.131 This is particularly true among working class or poor 
couples, as well as couples who include racial or ethnic minorities.132 
In other words, a significant portion of the children being raised by 
                                                                                                                                       
 126. GATES, LGB FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 117, at 5.  
 127. For discussions of recent research on family formation by same-sex partner 
households, see generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 17; Mignon R. Moore & Michael 
Stambolis-Ruhstorfer, LGBT Sexuality and Families at the Start of the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 39 ANN. REV. SOC. 491 (2013). For a historical overview of parenting by same-sex 
couples, see Douglas NeJaime, Before and After Marriage: Toward a Family-Law Account 
of Marriage Equality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 128. See Moore & Stambolis-Ruhstorfer, supra note 127, at 495. 
 129. See id. at 497 (observing that adoption rates are higher for high-income individu-
als); see also GATES, supra note 118, at F3 (demonstrating that adoption rates are higher for 
(1) same-sex couples with high levels of educational attainment than for those with low 
levels of educational attainment, and (2) Whites than for racial minorities).  
 130. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 10-11 (discussing artificial insemination 
with known donors); Cynthia Godsoe, The Quiet Gay Revolution in Family Law (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the history of adoptions from foster 
care by LGB individuals and couples).  
 131. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 118, at F3; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 6-7; 
Moore & Stambolis-Ruhstorfer, supra note 127, at 495. 
 132. See GATES, supra note 118, at F3. This may be inferred from the statistically high 
rate of racial and ethnic minorities raising children and the statistically high rate of cou-
ples with low levels of educational achievement raising children in general, as compared to 
the disproportionately high rate of white couples with high levels of educational achieve-
ment who adopt. Id.  
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same-sex couples are also children born in non-marital (heterosexual) 
relationships or children whose parents have dissolved prior (hetero-
sexual) marriages.  
 It has been difficult for demographers to trace precisely how these 
various factors interrelate with same-sex marriage, because until 
very recently, the U.S. Census Bureau and other government entities 
that collect information on couples and households have not distin-
guished between married and unmarried same-sex couples. In the 
fall of 2013, however, the Census Bureau released a small tabulation 
with limited data,133 and in fall 2014, the Bureau collected data on 
same-sex marriages within its main household statistics.134 Although 
this is a promising step forward, the wording that the Bureau used 
may have caused confusion and misreporting.135 Hopefully in the fu-
ture the process will be improved, and researchers will be able to un-
derstand, in much greater detail, the demographic profile of same-sex 
couples who choose to marry and the extent to which they track or 
depart from the more general trends regarding marriage and di-
vorce.136 Larger demographic trends suggest, however, that if gov-
ernment policies continue to rely exclusively, or primarily, on mar-
riage as the marker of family interdependence, the policies will leave 
out a significant portion of the poorest and most vulnerable same-sex 
couples and their children, just as the policies leave out a significant 
portion of the poorest and most vulnerable different-sex couples and 
their children.  
                                                                                                                                       
 133. In the past, the Census Bureau did not distinguish between same-sex married and 
same-sex unmarried couples in its reports; it treated same-sex couples living together 
simply as cohabiting couples. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
ABOUT SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: FERTILITY AND FAMILY STATISTICS BRANCH (2013), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/SScplfactsheet_final.pdf. In 2013, 
after Windsor, the Bureau released a special tabulation that, for the first time, distin-
guished between same-sex couples who reported as spouses and same-sex couples who 
reported as unmarried. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 120. 
 134. See D’vera Cohn, For the First Time, Census Data on Married Couples Includes 
Same-Sex Spouses, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/09/18/for-first-time-census-data-on-married-couples-includes-same-sex-spouses/. 
 135. See id.; see also Ben Casselman, The Census Still Doesn’t Know How Many Same-
Sex Couples There Are, FIVETHIRTYEIGHTLIFE (Nov. 25, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://fivethirty 
eight.com/features/the-census-still-doesnt-know-how-many-same-sex-couples-there-are/. 
 136. A study by researchers at the Williams Institute published in 2011 projected that 
marriage rates for same-sex couples would ultimately rise to the level of marriage rates of 
different-sex couples. See M.V. LEE BADGETT & JODY L. HERMAN, PATTERNS OF 
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES (2011). This 
study found that female couples were more likely than male couples to marry and that the 
same-sex couples who married were, on average, older than different-sex couples who mar-
ry, most likely because many long-established couples did not have the opportunity to mar-
ry when they might have first had the desire to do so. The study does not report on income 
or race of couples marrying. Id.  
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Windsor was a landmark decision. In holding that DOMA’s refusal 
to recognize same-sex marriages was unconstitutional, it rectified an 
important wrong and appropriately celebrated gay and lesbian mar-
riages as worthy of respect. As marriage rights have expanded in the 
months since Windsor was decided, many same-sex couples have 
seized the opportunity to marry. If Obergefell or another subsequent 
Supreme Court decision holds that all state bans are unconstitutional, 
undoubtedly many more will do so. But not all same-sex couples will 
marry; and if same-sex marriage trends follow those of different-sex 
marriages, those who do not marry are disproportionately likely to be 
poor or working class persons of color—precisely the same demograph-
ic of same-sex couples who are disproportionately likely to be raising 
children. 
 Indeed, even families headed by married same-sex couples may 
not map neatly onto traditional legal categories. Same-sex couples 
who plan together to have children through adoption or assisted re-
productive technology often choose to do so with a relatively high lev-
el of transparency, explicitly building connections to birth mothers, 
sperm donors, or surrogates that traditional parentage law—
premised on two, and only two, legal parents—does not anticipate.137 
Children born in a prior heterosexual relationship of one of the same-
sex spouses will generally continue to have a legal (and emotional) 
relationship with both biological parents, meaning that the non-
biologically-related same-sex partner will be a step-parent.138 This is 
also true for children with two legal same-sex parents who later sep-
arate, if either parent remarries. In other words, for many children 
being raised by same-sex couples, marriage rights are only one aspect 
of understanding the “integrity and closeness” of their families. 
 In this respect, children of same-sex couples are simply a subset of 
children within our society more generally. The rapid rise of non-
marital childbirth, divorce, cohabitation, and remarriage means that 
children with gay, lesbian, bisexual, or straight parents often live in 
families that depart dramatically from the “traditional” married-
parents-with-children paradigm. A generation ago, in a series of 
landmark decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged and protected 
                                                                                                                                       
 137. For a particularly colorful exploration of this subject, see Andrew Solomon, Meet 
My Real Modern Family, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 30, 2011, 9:02 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/ 
andrew-solomon-meet-my-real-modern-family-66661. For discussion of research assessing 
choices regarding known versus unknown donors for artificial adoption and open versus 
closed adoption, see GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 10-13.  
 138. For a discussion of the complexity of this step-parent role, see Fiona Tasker, Les-
bian and Gay Parenting Post-Heterosexual Divorce and Separation, in LGBT-PARENT 
FAMILIES: INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE (Abbie E. Gold-
berg & Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013).  
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familial bonds formed outside the province of marriage. The rhetoric 
and rationale of Windsor, by contrast, implicitly denigrated non-
marital families. I hope and believe that the Supreme Court will soon 
grant same-sex couples the right to marry in any state. But nation-
wide marriage equality will not end the need to reconsider the extent 
to which a large number of government policies and programs rely on 
marriage as the exclusive mechanism of recognizing family struc-
tures. It is not only time to advance marriage equality. It is also time 
to advance recognition of non-marital families. 
